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ABSTRACT
This article considers whether the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Director’s appointment of the Bureau’s Deputy Director
comports with the Appointments Clause. The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act established the Bureau
in July 2010, as well as the offices of the Bureau’s Director and
Deputy Director, to coordinate the regulation and enforcement of
federal consumer-financial-protection laws. Under that act, the
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1

Director appoints the Deputy Director. The Appointments Clause
permits “Heads of Departments” to appoint inferior officers like the
Deputy Director. But it is unclear if the Bureau is a “department”
and thus if the Director is a department head who can appoint the
2
Deputy Director. Although I argue that the Bureau should be
deemed a department, I explain why the Supreme Court’s recent
3
decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board
and prior Appointments Clause jurisprudence suggest otherwise.
Indeed, this article provides one of the first analyses and applications
of the new definition of “department” announced in Free Enterprise
Fund.
An inferior officer’s appointment (that of a deputy, no less) may
seem inconsequential. But an invalid appointment could, depending
on the Deputy Director’s duties, lead to unnecessary, time-consuming
litigation and perhaps even the invalidation of agency actions for the
newly established Bureau in its formative years. If so, the Bureau’s
opponents may have an additional, yet until now unnoticed, means of
disrupting the new Bureau. Congress should, without delay, remedy
the Deputy Director’s potentially improper appointment.
INTRODUCTION
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
enacted in July 2010, established the controversial Bureau of
4
Controversy continued when
Consumer Financial Protection.
President Obama appointed Elizabeth Warren, Harvard Law School
professor and former Chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel, as
5
“Assistant to the President” to oversee the Bureau’s creation.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(b)(5), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the
appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone,
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”).
3. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
4. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491);
Jesse Lee, President Obama Signs Wall Street Reform: No Easy Task, THE WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (July 21, 2010, 2:22 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/21/president-obama-signs-wall-streetreform-no-easy-task; Jim Puzzanghera, Consumer protection deal is near; Auto dealers are
likely to be largely exempt from the proposed agency’s oversight, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2010, at
B1 (explaining that some groups opposed the agency because of concerns that it
would unnecessarily expand government control over the economy).
5. Elizabeth Warren, Fighting to Protect Consumers, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept.
17, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/09/17/fighting-protectconsumers (“The President asked me, and I enthusiastically agreed, to serve as an
Assistant to the President and Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury on the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. He has also asked me to take on the job to
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Although the Senate would have had to consent for Warren to
6
become the Bureau’s Director, its approval was unnecessary for her
7
appointment as Assistant to the President. Her appointment created
significant debate as to whether the President made an improper
end-run around the Appointments Clause in Article II of the U.S.
8
Constitution.
This debate has overshadowed perhaps a more consequential, yet
easily ignored, officer-appointment question: Will the future
appointment of the Bureau’s Deputy Director—who under the Act
can be assigned broad, undefined powers—comply with the
Appointments Clause? If not, years of litigation could undermine
(and even invalidate) the Bureau’s work in which the Deputy
9
Director participates.
The key facts concerning the Bureau and the Deputy Director’s
appointment are as follows. The Bureau will “regulate the offering
and provision of consumer financial products or services under the
10
Federal consumer financial laws.” The Bureau is “established in the
11
Federal Reserve System,” an independent entity, as “an independent
12
bureau.” Although “established in” the Federal Reserve, the Bureau
has nearly complete autonomy from the Governors of the Federal

get the new CFPB started—right now.”); Jim Puzzanghera & Peter Nichols, Warren
will mold finance watchdog; For now, Obama gives her an advisory role with the new agency,
avoiding Senate fight, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at AA1 (“Republicans would strongly
oppose her nomination as permanent director.”); Alan Zibel & Maya Jackson
Randall, Bank Group’s Chief Expects Warren’s Nomination Soon, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2011,
3:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/05/02/bank-groups-chief-expectswarrens-nomination-soon/ (noting that the president and chief executive of the
Independent Community Bankers of America said that President Obama is likely to
nominate Warren as the Bureau’s Director, despite likely opposition from Senate
Republicans).
6. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5491).
7. See Douglas S. Onley, Note, Treading on Sacred Ground: Congress’s Power to
Subject White House Advisers to Senate Confirmation, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1183, 1193–
94 (1996) (discussing the status and history of White House advisors); see also 3
U.S.C. § 105(a)(1) (2006) (“[T]he President is authorized to appoint and fix the pay
of employees in the White House Office . . . .”).
8. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Obama, Warren and the Imperial Presidency, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 22, 2010, at A21 (“During America’s first 150 years, Ms. Warren’s
appointment as a special adviser to the White House would have been unthinkable.
Today, it’s par for the course.”).
9. See infra Part IV.
10. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).
11. Id. §§ 1011–1012, at 1964–65 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491–92).
12. Id. § 1011(a), at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491). The Bureau also
has an independent source of funding. See id. § 1017, at 1975 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. 5497).
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13

Reserve. Indeed, the Director of the Bureau heads the Bureau and
14
has significant powers. One of those powers includes appointing
15
the Deputy Director,
an office that Dodd-Frank expressly
16
establishes. The Act does not specify the Deputy Director’s duties,
but it provides that he or she “shall . . . serve as acting Director in the
17
absence or unavailability of the Director.”
Despite being logical and efficient, the Director’s appointment of
the Deputy Director may violate the Appointments Clause. That
clause requires that, as relevant here and as considered in Part I,
“Heads of Departments” appoint inferior officers like the Deputy
18
Director. As Part II discusses, the Deputy Director almost certainly
qualifies as an inferior officer whom a department head may appoint.
Part III argues that the Director should qualify as a department head
and thus should be able to appoint the Deputy Director. Yet the
19
Supreme Court’s recent 5-4 decision in Free Enterprise Fund —decided
only weeks before Dodd-Frank’s enactment—and the Court’s prior
Appointments Clause jurisprudence provide a reasonable, and even
20
likely, basis for holding otherwise.
Part IV considers the
ramifications of the Deputy Director’s potentially unconstitutional
appointment and provides possible solutions.
The Deputy Director’s appointment may at first seem
inconsequential. But she will likely be a powerful inferior officer,
13. Id. § 1012(c)(2), at 1965 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5492) (“The Board of
Governors may not⎯(A) intervene in any matter or proceeding before the Director,
including examinations or enforcement actions, unless otherwise specifically
provided by law; (B) appoint, direct, or remove any officer or employee of the
Bureau; or (C) merge or consolidate the Bureau, or any of the functions or
responsibilities of the Bureau, with any division or office of the Board or governors
or the Federal reserve banks.”); id. § 1012(c)(3), at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5492) (“No rule or order of the Bureau shall be subject to approval or review by the
Board of Governors. The Board of Governors may not delay or prevent the issuance
of any rule or order of the Bureau.”). Dodd-Frank establishes a Consumer Advisory
Board to advise the Bureau on emerging practices in the consumer-financial-services
industries. Id. § 1014(a), at 1974 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5494). Dodd-Frank
also permits the Financial Stability Oversight Council—comprised of the
chairpersons, directors, and secretaries of various federal agencies, including the
Director of the Bureau, id. § 111(b), at 1392 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321)—to
veto the Bureau’s regulations in certain instances, Dodd-Frank Act § 1023, 124 Stat.
at 1985 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5513).
14. See, e.g., id. § 1012(a)–(b), at 1965 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5492) (listing
Bureau’s powers and permitting Director to delegate authority); id. § 1022(b), at
1980–81 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512) (providing significant rulemaking
power).
15. Id. § 1011(b)(5)(A), at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
19. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
20. See infra notes 140–159 and accompanying text.
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responsible for numerous important Bureau activities, especially if
21
Her improper appointment
she assumes the Director’s duties.
could undermine those activities and significantly weaken, or at least
unnecessarily distract, the Bureau during its administrative
22
adolescence.
To avoid unnecessary disruption, Congress should
change how the Deputy Director is appointed when, as is likely, it
23
reconsiders the Bureau’s powers.
I.

THE APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS

The Appointments Clause provides how “Officers of the United
24
States” must be appointed.
The Appointments Clause’s formal
25
requirements are not mere “etiquette or protocol.” Instead, the
26
Clause “prevent[s] the diffusion of the appointment power.” To
that end, a principal officer may be appointed only if a majority of
27
the Senate consents to the President’s nominee. Inferior officers
28
may also be appointed in the same manner as principal officers.
Congress, however, in its discretion, can vest an inferior officer’s
appointment “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
29
Heads of Departments.”
In contrast to federal “officers,” the
Appointments Clause does not regulate the hiring of mere federal
30
employees.
Two key issues surround the Deputy Director’s appointment. First,
is the Deputy Director a principal officer, an inferior officer, or
31
merely an employee? Second, if the Deputy Director is an inferior
officer, is the Bureau a department, and is the Bureau’s Director,
32
accordingly, a department head?
21. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1012(a), 124 Stat. at 1965 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
5492) (detailing the powers of the Bureau).
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
25. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)).
26. Id. (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)); see also Evan J.
Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 140 n.89 (2006)
(citing The Federalist No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))
(explaining that the Appointments Clause “provide[s] some practical security for
each, against the invasion of the others”).
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659
(1997).
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
29. Id.; Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660.
30. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976) (per curiam) (citing
Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S.
508, 510 (1878)).
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part III.
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II. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR’S STATUS
The Deputy Director is very likely an inferior officer. Whether
someone is an inferior officer depends on whether one’s “‘work is
directed and supervised at some level’ by other officers appointed by
33
the President with the Senate’s consent.”
The Director almost
certainly has the power to supervise her Deputy Director, instruct her
on which policies to implement, oversee her job performance, and
34
remove her.
Thus, the Director’s supervisory power strongly
suggests that the Deputy Director is an inferior officer.
Whether or not the Director may remove the Deputy Director at
35
will, the Deputy Director is still an inferior officer. The Supreme
Court has indicated that an officer is very likely inferior if her
36
supervising officer can remove her at will. But at-will removal is not
a necessary condition for inferior-officer status if sufficient oversight
37
38
exists. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson held that
the independent prosecutor was an inferior officer despite the
39
Attorney General’s ability to remove her only for good cause.

33. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 (2010) (quoting Edmond,
520 U.S. at 663).
34. The Director’s ability to remove the Deputy Director—even if governed by a
good-cause standard—is very likely incident to her power to appoint. See Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926) (“This principle as a rule of constitutional
statutory construction [that the power of removal is incident to the power of
appointment], then generally conceded, has been recognized ever since. The reason
for this principle is that those in charge of and responsible for administering
functions of government who select their executive subordinates need in meeting
their responsibility to have power to remove those whom they appoint.” (citing In
re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 259 (1839); Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419
(1901); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 315 (1903))); Burnap v. United
States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920) (“The power to remove is, in the absence of statutory
provision to the contrary, an incident of the power to appoint.” (citing Hennen, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) at 259; Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227, 231 (1880); United States
v. Allred, 155 U.S. 591, 594 (1895); Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 293–94
(1900); Reagan, 182 U.S. at 426; Shurtleff, 189 U. S. at 316)); accord Carter v. Forrestal,
175 F.2d 364, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (citing Myers, 272 U.S. at 47; Eberlein v. United
States, 257 U.S. 82 (1921)).
35. Because whether the Director can remove the Deputy Director at will or only
for cause does not affect the Deputy Director’s inferior-officer status, it is not
necessary to determine whether the Deputy Director enjoys tenure protection. I
note, however, that 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2006)—which provides certain civil servants
tenure protection—may apply to the Deputy Director. Although at first blush the
tenure-protection provision governing the civil service appears to reach only
“employees,” it also reaches certain inferior “officers.”
See §§ 2101(1),
2102(a)(1)(B), 2104, 7511(a).
36. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162 (quoting Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664).
37. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988).
38. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
39. See id. at 671–72.
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The Supreme Court has, at times, also considered the limited or
40
expansive nature of an officer’s duties. For instance, in Morrison, the
Court determined that an independent prosecutor was an inferior
officer because she could be removed by a “higher Executive Branch
41
official” and had limited, temporary jurisdiction and duties.
In
considering the nature of the duties, the Morrison Court relied
primarily upon early Supreme Court decisions that distinguished
42
officers from employees, not principal officers from inferior officers.
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that an officer’s subordination (or
lack thereof) to a principal officer, not the nature of her duties,
43
should guide the Appointments Clause inquiry.
44
In Edmond v. United States, the Court, in an opinion written by
45
The
Justice Scalia, adopted Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison.
Edmond Court held that the judges of the Coast Guard Court of
46
Criminal Appeals were inferior officers. In reaching its decision, the
Court held that the significance of an individual’s authority is
relevant when determining whether the individual is either an officer
47
or employee. Likewise, the presence or absence of subordination is
48
relevant to whether an individual is an inferior or principal officer.
The Court distinguished Morrison on the ground that the Morrison
Court did “not attempt . . . to decide exactly where the line falls
49
between the two types of officers.” But the Supreme Court never
50
explicitly disapproved Morrison’s Appointments Clause analysis.

40. See id. at 671–73; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court,
the Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power”, 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 983–
84 (2000) (describing the debate as to whether “inferior” refers to an officer’s
hierarchy or relative importance).
41. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72.
42. See Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments
Clause Challenge, 60 HASTINGS L.J., 233, 256 & n.197 (2008) (noting the Court’s
reliance on United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867), and United
States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 512 (1878)). The Morrison Court also relied on
United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331 (1898). In Eaton, the Court determined that a
vice-consul’s temporary assumption of a consul’s duties did not render the viceconsul a principal officer. See id. at 336, 344.
43. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 719–21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
45. Id. at 662–64.
46. Id. at 666.
47. Id. at 662.
48. See id. at 662–63. Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion, reiterated his
view that the courts must consider both an officer’s subordination (or lack thereof)
and the importance of the officer’s duties. See id. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (“Having a superior officer is necessary for
inferior officer status, but not sufficient to establish it.”).
49. Id. at 661–62 (majority opinion).
50. Id.
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The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund follows
51
In Free Enterprise Fund, the
Edmond’s lead and ignores Morrison.
Supreme Court held that the SEC Commissioners’ appointment of
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (“PCAOB”)
52
members was constitutional. The Court first determined that the
SEC Commissioners, who are nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, had the ability to remove the PCAOB
53
members at will. Given this plenary removal power and the SEC
Commissioners’ other oversight powers, the Court had “no
54
hesitation” in deeming the PCAOB members inferior officers.
Notably, the Court did not consider the extent of the PCAOB
members’ powers in the portion of its opinion concerning the
appointment power. The Deputy Director’s powers may thus be
irrelevant in determining her status.
Yet, even if the Bureau’s and the Deputy Director’s powers over the
financial industry are relevant to the Deputy Director’s status, these
powers are unlikely to alter her status as an inferior officer. The
Court, in Free Enterprise Fund, had described PCAOB as having
55
“expansive powers to govern an entire industry [i.e., auditors],” but
these powers did not render the PCAOB members principal officers.
As for the Bureau’s Deputy Director, she can expressly assume the
56
Director’s duties if the Director is unavailable. And she can almost
57
certainly assume other duties that the Director assigns. But, as Free
Enterprise Fund indicates, the Deputy Director’s significant discretion
over a large swath of the economy does not necessarily render her a
58
principal officer.

51. See Samahon, supra note 42, at 258 (noting that Morrison’s precedential status
was questionable after Edmond).
52. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162–63 (2010).
53. See id. at 3162.
54. Id. (“Given that the Commission is properly viewed, under the Constitution,
as possessing the power to remove Board members at will, and given the
Commission’s other oversight authority, we have no hesitation in concluding that
under Edmond the Board members are inferior officers whose appointment Congress
may permissibly vest in a ‘Hea[d] of Departmen[t].’”).
55. Id. at 3147.
56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1011(b)(5), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5491).
57. Id. § 1012(b), at 1965 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5492) (permitting the
Director to delegate authority to “duly authorized employee[s], representative[s], or
agent[s]”).
58. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147–48 (holding that despite their
expansive power over the accounting industry, the board members of the PCAOB are
inferior officers).
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Likewise, the Deputy Director’s ability to assume the full powers of
the Director (a principal officer) does not render her a principal
59
60
officer. In United States v. Eaton, the Court held that a vice-consul
charged with assuming a consul’s duties under “special and
temporary conditions . . . is not thereby transformed into the
61
superior and permanent official.” The Deputy’s ability to fill the
Director’s shoes in certain scenarios, therefore, is not determinative.
But the Deputy Director’s ability to assume the Director’s powers
demonstrates that she is not merely an employee. The Supreme
Court has defined an “Officer of the United States” as “any appointee
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
62
States” and employees, in contrast, as “lesser functionaries
63
subordinate to officers of the United States.” The significance of
64
one’s authority “marks . . . the line between officer and nonofficer.”
Because district court clerks, thousands of clerks in the executive
departments, an assistant surgeon, and even a cadet-engineer have all
65
been deemed officers, it is extremely unlikely that the Deputy
Director, with broad, unspecified powers that can shape and
implement policy governing a large segment of the national

59. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011(b)(5)(B), 124 Stat. at 1964 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5491). The Director is likely a principal officer because she can be removed
only by the President. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Although the
Bureau rests within the Federal Reserve, the Governors cannot remove the Director;
cannot intervene in proceedings before the Director; cannot appoint, direct, or
remove Bureau officers or employees; cannot merge the Bureau’s functions; and
cannot review or delay the Bureau’s rules. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1012(c)(2)–(3), at
1965-66 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5492). The Financial Stability Oversight
Council’s power to veto the Bureau’s rules by a two-thirds vote would not affect the
Director’s principal status. Id. § 1023(b)–(c), at 1985–86 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5513). The Council would limit only one of the Bureau’s powers; the Council
would not have the power to remove her.
60. 169 U.S. 331 (1898).
61. Id. at 343.
62. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam). Moreover, the Deputy
Director’s office, along with her method of appointment and certain restrictions on
her activities, is established by statute. See 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)–(d); Landry v.
F.D.I.C., 204 F.3d 1125, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that administrative law judges are inferior
officers, because among other reasons, their offices are “established by law”).
63. Id. at 126 n.162.
64. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at
126).
65. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3179 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839) (district court
clerks); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1878) (thousands of clerks in
executive departments); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 762 (1878) (an
assistant-surgeon); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 484 (1886) (a cadetengineer)).
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economy, is an employee. Indeed, the Court has indicated that
even if certain of an individual’s duties are ministerial, the
67
individual’s discretionary duties will control.
In other words, an
individual cannot be an employee when performing certain duties
and an officer when performing other duties. Given the Deputy
Director’s ability to assume significant authority, including the
Director’s powers, she is almost certainly more than a “lesser
functionary” even if she will perform some ministerial,
nondiscretionary tasks.
III. THE BUREAU’S STATUS
Because the Deputy Director is very likely an inferior officer, she
must be appointed in one of the four methods under the
68
Appointments Clause. Her appointment by the Director can only
arguably constitute an appointment by the “Hea[d] of [a]
69
Departmen[t].” Two Supreme Court cases are especially relevant
when determining whether the Director heads a department: Freytag
70
v. Commissioner and Free Enterprise Fund. But these two cases (with a
total of three relevant opinions) send numerous contradictory signals
as to when an independent entity, such as the Bureau, constitutes a
department.
A. Freytag
In Freytag, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice
Blackmun, ultimately held that the U.S. Tax Court was one of the
71
“Courts of Law.” Thus, under the Appointments Clause, the Chief
Judge of the Tax Court could appoint special trial judges, who were

66. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1012(a), 124 Stat. at 1965 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5492) (listing the broad powers of the Bureau).
67. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991) (“Special trial judges are
not inferior officers for purposes of some of their duties . . . , but mere employees
with respect to other responsibilities. The fact that an inferior officer on occasion
performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the
Appointments Clause does not transform his status under the Constitution. If a
special trial judge is an inferior officer for purposes of [certain statutory
subsections], he is an inferior officer within the meaning of the Appointments
Clause and he must be properly appointed.”).
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; cf. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881 (holding that special
trial judges of the U.S. Tax Court are inferior officers and therefore must be
appointed under the Appointments Clause).
69. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163–64 (discussing the definition of
“Hea[d] of [a] Departmen[t]”).
70. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
71. Id. at 890–92.
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72

inferior officers.
But before turning to the “Courts of Law”
provision, the majority held that the U.S. Tax Court was not a
73
department.
The Court identified the purpose of the Appointments Clause: to
74
mitigate the “manipulation of official appointments.” Treating each
administrative organ as a department (as the government had
argued), and thus distributing the appointment power to every organ
within the executive branch, would have undermined the “Framers’
conclusion that widely distributed appointment power subverts
75
democratic government.” Accordingly, the Court reasoned that the
Constitution intends only a limited set of executive entities to qualify
76
as departments.
77
To define “departments,” the Court turned to its prior decisions.
Two of those decisions had limited departments to entities that
Congress had “expressly creat[ed] and giv[en] . . . the name of a
78
department.”
In one of those prior decisions, United States v.
79
Germaine, the Supreme Court read the Appointments Clause in
80
conjunction with the Opinion Clause of Article II.
That clause
permits the President to “require the Opinion, in writing, of the
81
In
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments.”
Germaine, the Court limited “Executive Departments” in the Opinion
Clause (and thus “Departments” in the Appointments Clause) to
those departments headed by cabinet members.
Because
“Departments” had to be headed by a cabinet member, “inferior
commissioners and bureau officers” would not qualify as “Heads of
82
Departments.” Although the Freytag majority expanded Germaine’s
definition of “department” by including “executive divisions like the
83
Cabinet-level departments,”
the majority otherwise accepted
72. Id. at 882–83. The “Excepting Clause” to the Appointments Clause provides
that “the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they [i.e., Congress] think proper, . . . in the Courts of Law.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2.
73. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 885–86.
74. Id. at 883 (quoting GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776–1787 79, 143 (1969)).
75. Id. at 885.
76. Id. at 886.
77. See id.; United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1878).
78. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886 (citing Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515
(1920); Germaine, 99 U.S. at 510–11).
79. 99 U.S. 508 (1878).
80. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886 (citing Burnap, 252 U.S. at 515; Germaine, 99 U.S. at
510–11).
81. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
82. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886 (quoting Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
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Germaine’s
cabinet-level
distinction
because
“Cabinet-level
84
departments are limited in number and easily identified.” Despite
rejecting the argument that the Tax Court was a department, the
majority reserved the question of whether a “principal agency” that is
not a cabinet-level department, such as the Securities and Exchange
85
Commission (“SEC”), was a department.
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the four concurring justices in
Freytag concluded that the U.S. Tax Court and the SEC—despite the
86
latter’s independent status—were departments.
These
establishments were departments because they were “free-standing,
87
Justice Scalia
self-contained entit[ies] in the Executive Branch.”
took issue with the majority’s understanding that the Appointments
88
Clause was meant to limit the Executive Branch’s power. He argued
that the Appointments Clause deposited the appointment power in
the executive branch as a reaction to the “division and faction” that
legislative appointments of executive officers had caused in state
89
governments. Granting the legislature the power to appoint would
have led less-accountable legislators to appoint, and even create
90
offices for, friends and patrons.
Not only did the majority misunderstand the purpose of the
Appointments Clause in the concurring justices’ view, but nothing
limited departments to “cabinet-level” agencies. Neither Congress
nor the Constitution, as a preliminary matter, decides whether
91
certain officers are members of the cabinet.
Yet, putting this
indefiniteness of “cabinet members” aside, limiting departments to
cabinet-level agencies means that the appointment of many inferior
84. Id.
85. Id. at 887 n.4.
86. The concurring justices rejected the majority’s conclusion that the U.S. Tax
Court was a “Court[] of law.” They argued that the “Courts of law” referred only to
Article III courts. See id. at 901–02 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
87. See id. at 914–15 (arguing that the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court is a
department head).
88. Id. at 904 n.4.
89. Id. (quoting WOOD, supra note 74, at 407).
90. Id. The concurring justices stated that “[t]he Appointments Clause is,
intentionally and self-evidently, a limitation on Congress.” Id. Yet, it hardly seems
self-evident that a Clause that limits the President’s ability to appoint principal and, in
most instances, inferior officers was meant to limit only Congress. Instead, by seeking
to limit the power of any single branch to appoint officers, the Clause is best read to
limit both Congress and the President. Cf. Henry Monaghan, The Protective Power of
the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 n.76 (1993) (“Justice Scalia’s assertion that
‘[t]he Appointments Clause is, intentionally and self-evidently, a limitation on
Congress’ is misleading oversimplification.”).
91. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 917–18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).
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officers in independent agencies would be invalid because the heads
of these independent agencies, not cabinet-level principal officers,
92
typically appoint them.
The concurring justices argued that the
Appointments Clause permitted principal officers—whether or not
93
part of the cabinet—to appoint their subordinate officers. It follows
from this understanding that “the term ‘Departments’ means all
94
independent executive establishments.”
B. Free Enterprise Fund
Almost twenty years later in Free Enterprise Fund the Court
considered the reserved question of the SEC’s status. The plaintiffs
argued that the SEC was not a department and thus that the SEC
Commissioners could not, as permitted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
95
appoint the members of PCAOB. Free Enterprise Fund adopted the
reasoning of the four concurring justices in Freytag and held that the
96
SEC was a department. The Court noted that the nation’s Founders
understood a department to be a “separate allotment or part of
business; a distinct province, in which a class of duties are [sic]
97
allotted to a particular person.” Indeed, Congress, in 1792, had
permitted the Postmaster General to appoint inferior officers, even
98
though he was not a “Secretary” or a cabinet-level official. With
Congress’s early practice in mind, the Court held that the SEC was a
department under the Appointments Clause because it is “a free-

92. See id. at 918.
93. See id. at 919 (“If the Appointments Clause is read as I read it, all inferior
officers can be made appointable by their ultimate (sub-Presidential) superiors
. . . .”); id. at 918 (“A number of factors support the proposition that ‘Heads of
Departments’ includes the heads of all agencies immediately below the President in
the organizational structure of the Executive Branch.”); id. at 920 (“[The
Constitution’s use of the word ‘department’ may seem strange] only because the
Founders did not envision that an independent establishment of such small size and
specialized function would be created.”); id. (“Principal officers could be permitted
by law to appoint their subordinates.”).
94. See 26 U.S.C. § 7443(f) (2006) (“Judges of the Tax Court may be removed by
the President, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.”); Freytag, 501 U.S.
at 919 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
95. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 (2010) (“But,
petitioners argue, the Commission is not a ‘Departmen[t]’ like the ‘Executive
departments’ (e.g., State, Treasury, Defense) listed in 5 U.S.C. § 101.”); see also
15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4) (permitting the SEC Commissioners to appoint PCAOB
members).
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828) (def. 2) (1995 facsimile ed.)).
98. Id. at 3163.
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standing component of the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or
99
contained within any other component.”
The Court’s decision was not as clear as it may seem. The Court,
perhaps importantly, did not simply state that the SEC qualified
because it was a “free-standing, self-contained entity,” as the Freytag
concurring justices would have had it in one portion of their
100
opinion.
Likewise, the Court did not say that the SEC was a
department only because it was an “independent executive
establishment[],” as the Freytag concurring justices would have had it
101
in another portion of their opinion. Instead, the Court considered
both independence and noncontainment, without clarifying whether
each characteristic was a necessary condition for an entity to
102
constitute a department.
Free Enterprise Fund also failed to clarify
exactly which reasoning in the Freytag concurring opinion it adopted
and which portion, if any, of the majority opinion in Freytag remains
103
good law. These ambiguities affect the Bureau and other similarly
situated entities.
C. Freytag, Free Enterprise Fund, and the Consumer Bureau
Congress created the Bureau’s administrative structure while Free
104
Enterprise Fund was submitted to the Supreme Court for decision.
The Bureau is an exotic, but not an entirely unique, administrative
105
creature. It is an independent establishment that rests within—yet
106
is not accountable to—another independent establishment.
99. Id.
But see Gary Lawson, The “Principal” Reason Why the PCAOB Is
Unconstitutional, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 73, 82 (2009) (“I would state the ultimate
test for departmental status as follows: a unit of the federal executive is a
constitutional ‘Department[]’ under the Appointments Clause if it has sufficient
organizational identity and decisional authority to be a constitutional ‘Department[]’
under the Appointments Clause. If that sounds absurdly circular to you, then you
are half-right: it is circular, but not absurdly so.”). Professor Lawson argued, prior to
the Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund, that PCAOB itself qualified as a
“department” and that its members were principal officers. See id. at 75.
100. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 915 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
101. Id. at 919.
102. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163.
103. See id. at 3162–63 (discussing the Freytag opinion without clarifying upon
which part the Court relies).
104. Free Enterprise Fund was argued on December 7, 2009, and the court issued its
decision on June 28, 2010, only three weeks before the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted
on July 21, 2010. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3138; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376
(2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301).
105. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is a similarly independent entity
within the purview of the Department of Energy. See infra note 112 and
accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
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I have uncovered nothing in the legislative history directly
revealing why Congress decided to house the Bureau within the
107
Federal Reserve. Perhaps Congress did so as an illusory concession
to Republicans who opposed “the Obama administration’s original
aim of creating a stand-alone Consumer Financial Protection
108
Agency . . . .”
Instead, Republicans sought to place “consumer
109
Senate Democrats, by
protection powers with [bank] regulators.”
ultimately placing the Bureau within the Federal Reserve, may have
desired to give the appearance that the Bureau was part of the federal
bank-regulatory apparatus. But by giving the Federal Reserve
110
essentially no powers over the Bureau, Senate Democrats continued
to propose an independent agency—albeit one that was not free111
standing. Another possibility is that the Senate sought to model the
Bureau on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), an
“independent regulatory commission” that is “established within” the
112
Department of Energy.

107. The Senate’s bill created the Bureau in its present form. See S. Rep. No. 111176, at 11 (2010) (explaining the need for the Bureau to protect consumers by
regulating bank practices, but failing to explain the rationale for housing it inside
the Federal Reserve). Although dissenting senators complained that the Bureau was
“a massive new entity whose power and autonomy have no current equivalent
anywhere else in the Federal government,” they did not appear to consider other
structural alternatives for the Bureau. See id. at 246–47 (criticizing the Bureau’s
ineffectiveness at regulating failing banks, without proposing an alternative).
108. Silla Brush, GOPs Oppose Proposal for Consumer Bureau at Treasury Department,
THE HILL (Feb. 27, 2010 9:30 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/84083gops-oppose-proposal-for-consumer-agency-at-treasury-dept (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. See supra note 13.
111. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies:
Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 73 (2010) (citing Sewell Chan, Dodd Proposes
Giving Fed the Task of Consumer Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, at B2
(“[A]dvocates, mindful of fierce Republican opposition to a stand-alone agency, have
said that they are less concerned about where the entity is housed than the scope of
its authority and the independence of its leadership and budget.”)) (noting that the
Mortgage Bankers Association, the Chairman of the FDIC, and congressional
Republicans, among others, “ultimately pushed the Administration to give up on a
free-standing agency”).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 7171(a) (2006). FERC officials are similarly independent from
the Department of Energy as the Bureau officials are from the Governors of the
Federal Reserve. Id. § 7171(d) (“In the performance of their functions, the
members, employees, or other personnel of the Commission shall not be responsible
to or subject to the supervision or direction of any officer, employee, or agent of any
other part of the Department.”). Unlike the Bureau, however, FERC is not led by a
single director. Instead, it is led by a five-member commission. Id. § 7171(b)(1); see
Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALJ Independence, and Administrative Courts: The Recent
Changes in Louisiana’s Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REV. 431, 439 (1999)
(referring to independent agencies led by a single individual as the “strangest
[administrative] animals yet”).
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Regardless of why Congress structured the Bureau as it did, its
placement within the Federal Reserve may deprive the Bureau of
113
departmental status.
Assuming that the Bureau has a distinct
114
the Bureau may not satisfy the Court’s other
province,
requirements, viz., that the Bureau not be subordinate to or
contained within any other free-standing component of the Executive
115
Branch.
Free Enterprise Fund does not clarify whether both, or only
one, of these criteria must exist for the Bureau to qualify as a
department. The Bureau is not subordinate to the Federal Reserve
System because the Governors cannot appoint, direct, or remove the
Bureau’s employees or officers, and the Governors cannot merge or
116
consolidate the Bureau with the Federal Reverse divisions or banks.
But the Bureau is “contained within” the Federal Reserve System,
itself an independent, free-standing component of the Executive
117
Branch. If, on one hand, a department must be both independent
118
and self-contained, the Bureau is not a department. But if, on the

113. The House of Representatives’ proposal created a Consumer Financial
Protection Commission that, much like the SEC, would have been a free-standing,
independent agency led by five commissioners appointed by the President with the
Senate’s advice and consent. See Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009,
H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. §§ 111–12 (2009) (establishing the Consumer Protection
Agency). A Consumer Financial Protection Oversight Board, made of various federal
officers, would have advised the Commission. Id. §§ 112–13. This administrative
structure likely would not have posed an Appointments Clause question.
114. The Bureau’s significant and independent role in regulating consumerfinancial products likely provides the Bureau “a distinct province, in which a class of
duties [is] allotted to a particular person.” Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct.
3138, 3162–63 (2010). Nevertheless, as the statute creating the Bureau recognizes,
the SEC, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the FTC, and other federal
establishments also regulate consumer-financial products. Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1015, 124 Stat. 1376,
1974 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5495). Thus, whether the Bureau has a
“distinct province” with a particularized “class of duties” is not free from doubt. Cf.
Barkow, supra note 111, at 55–56 (noting how, to prevent agency capture and to
ensure enforcement of regulatory or statutory mandates, Congress often provides
more than one agency power over regulated industries).
115. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163.
116. Dodd-Frank Act § 1012(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 1965–66 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5492). The Financial Stability Oversight Council, however, can reject the
Bureau’s regulations by a two-thirds vote. Id. § 1023(c)(3), at 1985–86 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5513). Although this veto power limits one of the Bureau’s
powers, I doubt that this limitation alone would deprive the Bureau of its
independent status. Not only is the Council’s authority circumscribed, but it is far
from certain that the Council would qualify as a “component of the Executive
Branch” to which the Bureau would be subordinate. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at
3163.
117. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 U.S.C. § 222 (2006).
118. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163.
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other hand, a department may be either independent or self119
contained, then the Bureau is more likely a department.
1.

The normative view
In my view, the Board’s independence from other executive
components alone should render it a department. The Freytag
concurring opinion strongly suggests that a putative department
head’s independence from other principal officers should control
120
her status. That opinion proposed that “all inferior officers can be
121
made appointable by their ultimate (sub-Presidential) superiors.”
That proposal makes sense. The superior officer is the one who must
supervise and rely upon the inferior officer. Permitting all superior
officers to appoint their inferior officers prevents the anomalous
result of requiring Congress, if it chooses a departmental
appointment, to bestow the appointment power upon an unrelated
122
department head. In the Deputy Director’s case, the Director is a
properly appointed principal officer who is not subordinate to any
other executive officer and, thus, should be able to appoint her
123
deputy.
The executive entity’s subordination, or the lack thereof,
124
to another executive component should be the guidepost.
119. Id. There may be one additional permissible reading of Free Enterprise Fund.
Perhaps the standard (“not subordinate to or contained within any other . . .
component”) merely seeks to use “contained within” as an appositive for
“subordinate to.” Id. If this were so, agency independence would be the guiding
criterion and permit the Director to be a department head. But if this were the
intended meaning, the Court’s language created ambiguity where none even
arguably existed. Such an interpretation would also likely be contrary to a portion of
the Freytag concurrence, which conceded that the now-defunct Board of Tax Appeals
(an independent agency) would not have qualified as a department because it was a
subdivision of the Treasury Department. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 915
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also infra notes
144–151 and accompanying text.
120. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 919 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (“This evident meaning—that the term ‘Departments’ means all
independent executive establishments—is also the only construction that makes
sense of [the] sharp distinction between principal officers and inferior officers.”).
121. Id. This understanding is also consistent with United States v. Germaine. The
Germaine Court stated that “heads of departments” were not “inferior commissioners
and bureau officers, who are themselves the mere aids and subordinates of the heads
of the departments.” 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1878). Even when the Germaine Court
considered bureaus and commissions, its inquiry focused on those entities’
subordination or lack thereof. Id.
122. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 919 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (explaining that an interpretation requiring all inferior officers whose
superiors are not Cabinet members to be appointed by the President is an
“implausible” result).
123. Scholars and the Supreme Court have reasoned that, at the very least, all
principal officers are heads of departments, even if not all heads of departments are
principal officers. Compare Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 37 (1994) (arguing that principal executive
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Refusing to treat the Bureau as a department merely because it is
housed within another establishment (and thus not self-contained) is
125
unjustifiable formalism. The Bureau has a specific sphere of duties
in which the encasing establishment (the Federal Reserve) cannot
126
In other words, Congress has provided the Bureau a
intervene.
officers may be merely a subset of department heads), and Kimberly N. Brown,
Presidential Control of the Elite “Non-Agency”, 88 N.C. L. REV. 71, 90–91 n.128 (2009)
(same), with Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511 (comparing the use of principal officers and
departments in the Opinions Clause to their use in the Appointments Clause and
stating that “the principal officer in the one case is the equivalent of the head of the
department in the other”), and Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash,
The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 635 (1994) (“[T]he
interchangeable use of numerous terms for officers we today call Secretaries
indicates that ‘principal officers in the Executive Departments’ and ‘Heads of
Departments’ are one and the same.”). Yet, if the Director is a principal officer
(because she is subordinate to only the President) but not a department head as
Free Enterprise Fund suggests, then these scholars and the Germaine Court were
incorrect. Some principal officers, such as the Director, would not be heads of
departments. Cf. United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 337–45 (1898) (referring to
consuls as “principal officer[s]” and “principal officials,” although consuls are not
likely heads of departments because the Secretary of State would be the relevant
head of department).
124. As an aside, the meaning of “independence” in the separation-of-powers
context does not have a uniform meaning. The meaning changes as one addresses
the Appointments Clause, the President’s removal power, or practical administrative
hegemony.
Independence (or nonsubordination) in the context of the
Appointments Clause and an officer’s status likely refers to whether the appointing
officer can be removed only by the President, as opposed to any other executive
officers. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Free Enter. Fund v.
PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 (2010) (“‘[I]nferior officers’ are officers whose work is
directed and supervised at some level’ by other officers appointed by the President
with the Senate’s consent.”) (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63
(1997)). But in the removal-power context, independence is likely tied to the ability
of the President or other supervising officer to remove a subordinate officer for only
certain causes. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3157–58. This form of independence
is what shapes the traditional understanding of “independent agency.” See Free
Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 701 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“[Independent agency] is the term that traditionally has been applied
by the Supreme Court, the Congress, and the Executive Branch to agencies like the
PCAOB whose heads are not removable at will.”). But if these differences were not
enough, Professor Barkow correctly argues that the indicia of true administrative
independence is a function of, among other things, tenure protection, budgetary
control, the ability to obtain politically useful information, and protection from
interference and competition from other federal and state agencies. See Barkow,
supra note 111, at 18; cf. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3156–57 (strongly implying that
practical indicia of independence or control are not relevant to separation-of-powers
concerns because it deemed the power to remove as necessary for the President to
have sufficient control over executive officers).
125. Although a formal inquiry may be suitable when the Constitution’s text
compels it (e.g., according to the Appointments Clause, the House cannot appoint
executive officers even if it makes sense for the House to do so in a particular
instance, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2), nothing in the constitutional text compels
a department to be both independent and self-contained.
Requiring an
independent entity to be self-contained creates an unnecessary, formal distinction
devoid of meaning.
126. See supra note 13.

BARNETT.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

APPOINTMENT WITH TROUBLE

5/17/2011 7:21 PM

1477

condominium within the Federal Reserve complex, but the Bureau is
not beholden to the Federal Reserve merely because they share
127
walls. Requiring Congress to create stand-alone bureaus would be a
purely formal gesture that lacks constitutional compulsion and does
not change the substance of the Bureau’s powers, affect any potential
appointment-power dilution, or otherwise alter the Director’s power,
128
status, or appointment.
Indeed, if self-containment were required, certain independent
agencies would be denied departmental status merely because they
are “established in” another executive component, despite their
129
similarity to certain “departments.” For instance, both the Bureau
and FERC would satisfy the nonsubordination criterion yet fail the
self-containment criterion because they are “established in” another
130
executive component. But other independent agencies, such as the
131
National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) and the Social
132
Security Administration (“SSA”), with independent powers similar
(if not more limited) in breadth to the Bureau and the FERC’s,
would be deemed departments merely because their organic acts do
133
not expressly place them within another executive component
(such as the Departments of Transportation or Health and Human
Services, respectively). It is hard to fathom why the Free Enterprise
Fund Court would have sought to deny departmental status to
134
powerful agencies like FERC, but grant it to the NTSB and the SSA.
127. See supra note 13; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964–65 (2010) (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5491) (establishing the Bureau’s offices inside the Federal Reserve in
Washington, D.C.).
128. The constitutionality of other deputy appointments may be doubtful,
especially deputies within nonindependent bureaus and offices. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.
§ 6704(b) (2006) (permitting Chief of the Forest Service to appoint Deputy Chief for
International Forestry). For these deputies, the Court’s precedents, as well as the
opinions of individual justices, strongly suggest that these appointments are not
constitutional if the deputies are “inferior officers.” See infra notes 146–147. Notably,
Congress often permits the President or a department head to appoint deputies. See,
e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(c)(5) (2006) (permitting Secretary of the Treasury, not
Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, to appoint Office’s deputies); 6 U.S.C.
§ 321c(a) (permitting President, with Senate’s advice and consent, to appoint FEMA
deputies); 5 U.S.C. § 1102(b) (permitting President, with Senate’s advice and
consent, to appoint the Deputy Director of the Office of Personnel Management).
129. See supra notes 11, 112 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 11, 112 and accompanying text.
131. See 49 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (“The [NTSB] is an independent establishment of the
United States Government.”).
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 901(a) (“There is hereby established, as an independent
agency in the executive branch of the Government, a [SSA] . . . .”).
133. See supra notes 131–132 and accompanying text.
134. Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund, joined by three other justices,
suggests that the FERC (and thus the Bureau) would qualify as a “department.” In
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Moreover, even if the Court were to treat in the same manner express
and implied statutory establishment of an agency within another
executive component, many administrative establishments (such as
the NTSB and the SSA) would likely lose departmental status—
thereby creating even more difficulties for ensuring that principal
officers can appoint their subordinates.
Finally, that Congress creates more principal officers by creating
additional independent establishments does not, despite the Freytag
135
majority’s concern, dilute the appointment power.
The
government’s business—whether rightly or wrongly—is growing as
more officers are needed to provide increased regulation and
136
enforcement.
When creating the Bureau with its new regulatory
and enforcement powers, Congress did not leave the size of
government static while increasing the number of appointing
137
officers. Instead, the number of appointing officers grew with the
138
Ultimately, permitting the Director to
government’s business.
appoint her Deputy Director merely allows a principal officer to be
clearly responsible for the Deputy Director’s actions without
139
improper appointing-power diffusion.
2.

The contrary view
Despite the compelling reasons for deeming the independent
Bureau a department, the Freytag and Free Enterprise Fund opinions can
140
be read to require both independence and self-containment.

his appendix, he lists “24 stand-alone federal agencies (i.e., ‘departments’) whose
heads are, by statute, removable by the President only ‘for cause.’” Free Enter. Fund
v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3184 app. A (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). One of those
“stand-alone federal agencies (i.e., ‘departments’)” is the FERC. Id. at 3186 app. A.
He also lists the NTSB and the SSA. See id. at 3187–88 app. A. The dissent does not
define “stand-alone” (i.e., does it refer to independence? self-containment? a
combination of both? something else?).
135. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 885 (1991) (“The [Appointments]
Clause reflects our Framers’ conclusion that widely distributed appointment power
subverts democratic government.”).
136. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155 (“No one doubts Congress’s power to
create a vast and varied federal bureaucracy,”).
137. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1013(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1966–67 (2010) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5493) (giving the Director broad discretion to decide how many employees
to employ and in what capacity).
138. Id.
139. John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 904, 915 (2009) (“The Appointments Clause is designed to prevent the
diffusion of appointment power precisely so that the individual with primary
responsibility for a governmental department is both at a high level (subordinate
only to the President) and readily identifiable.”).
140. See infra notes 142–154 and accompanying text.
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Those opinions suggest that “department” should have a
circumscribed meaning and thus apply only to self-contained
141
entities. Moreover, reading Free Enterprise Fund’s two criteria in the
disjunctive may lead to untenable results in other, albeit hypothetical,
scenarios.
The majority in Freytag held that its limited understanding of
department was consistent with the purpose of the Appointments
Clause to “prevent[] Congress from distributing power too widely by
limiting the actors in whom Congress may vest the power to
142
appoint . . . [and thereby] subvert[] democratic government.”
Perhaps regardless of whether federal business grows or remains
static, the Court feared that “holding that every organ in the
Executive Branch is a department would multiply indefinitely the
143
number of actors eligible to appoint.”
Even the concurring justices in Freytag suggested that a department
144
must be self-contained. They referred to the Tax Court as “a freestanding, self-contained entity” when deciding its departmental
145
status and noted that the Court had in other decisions held that
bureaus within traditional executive agencies were not
146
In fact, the concurring justices conceded that the
departments.
former Board of Tax Appeals, as a former subdivision of the Treasury
147
Department, could not qualify as a department.
The Board, like
148
The distinguishing
the Tax Court, was an “independent agency.”
feature between the Tax Court and the Board of Tax Appeals was self-

141. See supra notes 74–76, 99 and accompanying text.
142. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 885 (1991).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 915 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 917 (referring to Germaine’s holding that the Commissioner of
Pensions, an official within the Interior Department, was not a head of a
department); Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 514–15 (1920) (indicating—
although Justice Scalia says holding—that the Bureau of Public Buildings and
Grounds, a bureau within the War Department, was not a department)).
147. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 915 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (“If, for instance, the Tax Court were a subdivision of the Department of
the Treasury—as the Board of Tax Appeals used to be—it would not qualify [as a
department]. In fact, however, the Tax Court is a free-standing, self-contained entity
in the Executive Branch, whose Chief Judge is removable by the President (and, save
impeachment, no one else).”).
148. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 253, 337 (“Any member
of the Board may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office, but for no other reason.”); id. at 338 (“The Board shall be an
independent agency in the executive branch of the Government.”); Freytag, 501 U.S.
at 885, 891.
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containment; the former was self-contained and thus a department,
150
And finally the Free Enterprise Fund Court
while the latter was not.
did not simply conclude that all independent establishments or
“agencies” were departments, despite the ease with which it could
151
have done so.
The Freytag concurring opinion, moreover, may ultimately reject
the functional concerns that support my normative determination.
The concurring justices suggested that the Court should not create
distinct separation-of-powers jurisprudence for independent, as
opposed to traditionally executive, agencies based on their
152
independence alone.
My conclusion, however, requires that
independent bureaus and offices be deemed departments when they
rest within other establishments, although nonindependent executive
153
offices and bureaus would not be deemed departments.
Formal
notions of self-containment, accordingly, may trump functionalism
and even common-sense concerns no matter which Freytag opinion
154
governs.
Finally, considering the two criteria in the disjunctive may lead to
questionable results. For instance, assume that a hypothetical
executive establishment, contrary to the Bureau, is subordinate to
another executive establishment but self-contained. Under the
disjunctive theory, the self-contained, subordinate executive
establishment would be a department even though the department
head would likely be an inferior officer since he is subordinate to
155
another executive establishment.
The Court has never suggested
156
Indeed, such an
that inferior officers can be department heads.
149. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 915 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
150. Id.
151. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162–63 (2010).
152. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3176 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court
should not create a separate constitutional jurisprudence for the ‘independent
agencies.’”); Freytag, 501 U.S. at 921 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (“[A]djusting the remainder of the Constitution to compensate for [this
distinction] is a fruitless endeavor.”); see also id. at 886 (majority opinion) (“[T]he
term ‘Heads of Departments’ does not embrace ‘inferior commissioners and bureau
officers.’” (quoting United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1878))); Burnap v.
United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920) (stating the principle enunciated in Germaine
more broadly because the Court failed to refer to inferiority or independence when
stating that “department” “does not include heads of bureaus or lesser divisions”).
153. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 3–23, 127–128, 140–153 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (setting out the definition of an
inferior officer as one who is subordinate to an officer appointed by the President).
156. See Lawson, supra note 99, at 80–81 (“There is nothing logically impossible
about vesting the appointment of inferior officers in other inferior officers, but it
certainly looks odd given the phrasing of the Appointments Clause.”).
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interpretation would permit Congress to expand the “Heads of
Departments” significantly by relying on a nonsubstantive, formal
157
criterion.
That interpretation would offend the Freytag majority
158
opinion’s concern over appointment-power dilution. Treating both
criteria as necessary conditions precludes this odd result.
Given the ambiguity in the Court’s decisions and uncertainty as to
which portions of Freytag are good law, a significant constitutional
question exists as to whether the Bureau is a department, and thus
whether the Director is a department head who can appoint the
159
Deputy Director.
IV. AVOIDING THE SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION
Depending upon the Deputy Director’s duties and the judicial
remedies for an unconstitutional appointment, a decision holding
that the Deputy Director’s appointment is unconstitutional could be
160
Admittedly, we cannot know the
debilitating to the Bureau.
consequences of an improper appointment until we learn which
powers the Deputy Director will assume. Yet, most matters in which
the Deputy Director may participate—such as rulemaking,
adjudicatory matters, and enforcement proceedings—would likely be
161
called into question and perhaps even invalidated.
Indeed, when
157. See supra note 142–143 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
159. If the Director is not a department head, the Bureau could not rely upon the
“approbation rule,” which permits a department head to approve a subordinate’s
appointment of an inferior officer. That rule applies to situations in which the
statute expressly requires the department head to approve the appointment.
See United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 532–33 (1888); United States v. Hartwell,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393–94 (1868). First, the Bureau’s situation would differ
because it may not qualify as a “department” in the first instance and thus have no
head to approbate the decision. Second, even if the President or another
department head attempted to approbate the Deputy Director’s appointment, that
approbation would encounter statutory difficulties because Dodd-Frank gives the
Director, not the President or another department head, the power to appoint the
Deputy Director. The statute does not give the President or other department head
the power to approbate the appointment. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(b)(5)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964
(2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491); Smith, 124 U.S. at 533 (rejecting the
argument that a head of department’s approval is relevant if no law expressly gives
the department head the power to approve); see also United States v. Mourat, 124
U.S. 303, 308 (1888) (noting that a certain clerk was not an officer because, among
other reasons, there was no act that required a head of department to approve an
appointment).
160. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137–38 (1976) (per curiam)
(invalidating several “executive” powers of the FEC after the commissioners’
appointment was deemed unconstitutional).
161. Id. But the remedy for any violation is far from clear. Most (of the few)
Appointments Clause challenges arise when an officer seeks a principal officer’s
salary or when courts must decide whether an individual was a federal “officer”
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invalidating the appointment of the Federal Election Commissioners
162
in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court invalidated all of the agency’s powers
163
that were executive in nature.
Thus, the Deputy Director’s
unconstitutional appointment will, at the very least, likely deprive her
164
of prospective executive power.
Although the Buckley Court provided the FEC Commissioners’ past
165
executive actions “de facto” validity, the Court later suggested that
166
the remedy in Buckley had limited future application. The Court’s
167
de-facto-validity remedy, while avoiding disruption to improperly

under a federal criminal statute. See, e.g., Smith, 124 U.S. at 533 (holding that
defendant was not an “officer” for purposes of conversion charge); United States v.
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509, 512 (1878) (holding that defendant-surgeon was not an
“officer” and thus could not be tried under extortion statute that applied to “[e]very
officer of the United States”); Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 393–94 (holding that
defendant was an officer within the Treasury Department when the Court considered
defendant’s liability for embezzlement).
162. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
163. See id. at 140–41 (stating that executive functions can be “discharged only by
persons who are ‘Officers of the United States’ within the language of that section”).
164. The Buckley Court permitted the FEC to continue its legislative functions,
such as data collection and factual investigation, because Congress could delegate
similar duties to congressional committees. See id. at 138–41. The Supreme Court
may have permitted the FEC to continue its legislative functions because either (1)
the entire agency was headed by inappropriately appointed commissioners and thus
not a valid independent or executive agency, or (2) Congress was (too) involved in
the selection of the FEC Commissioners’ appointment. Cf. id. at 126–27 (noting that
none of the commissioners’ appointments complied with the Appointments Clause);
id. at 140–41 (holding that “present Commission” cannot perform quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial duties). The Bureau, in contrast, is not threatened with wholesale
invalidation, and the Director’s appointment is not invalid. Thus, the Court may not
permit the Deputy Director to exercise either legislative or executive functions.
165. Id. at 142.
166. Id. (“[T]he Commission’s inability to exercise certain powers because of the
method by which its members have been selected should not affect the validity of the
Commission’s administrative actions and determinations to this date . . . .” (citing
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 379 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 550–51 (1972) (per curiam); Ryan v.
Tinsley, 316 F.2d 430, 431–432 (10th Cir. 1963); Schaefer v. Thomson, 251 F. Supp.
450, 453 (D. Wyo. 1965), aff’d sub nom. Harrison v. Schaeffer, 383 U.S. 269 (1966)));
see also Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1995) (distinguishing Buckley
and narrowing its remedial provisions, refusing to “extend them beyond their facts,”
when rejecting the application of a “de facto officer” doctrine commonly applied to
statutorily improper appointments).
167. The Buckley Court’s de facto validation remedy “may be thought to have
implicitly applied a form of the de facto officer doctrine.” Ryder, 515 U.S. at 184.
Although Buckley did not expressly rely upon the doctrine, the decision “validated the
past acts of public officials.” Id. at 183. The Court explained that:
The de facto officer doctrine confers validity upon acts performed by a person
acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered that
the legality of that person’s appointment or election to office is deficient.
[It] springs from the fear of the chaos that would result from multiple . . .
suits challenging every action taken by every official whose claim to office
could be open to question, and seeks to protect the public by insuring the
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appointed agency officials, takes the wind out of an Appointments
168
Clause challenge, as the Court later obliquely conceded. In Ryder v.
169
United States, the Court explained that Buckley had relied upon
apportionment decisions that had “held that legislative acts
performed by legislators . . . elected in accordance with an
170
unconstitutional apportionment were not therefore void.”
The
Court in Ryder narrowed the remedy in Buckley and the earlier
apportionment cases by stating that those decisions concerned
171
challenges to an entire legislative (or executive) body. A challenge
to the Deputy Director’s appointment, unlike the apportionment and
Buckley cases, challenges one office, not an entire agency. The defacto doctrine, therefore, is unlikely to validate the Deputy Director’s
172
actions.
Indeed, the better remedy in the context of an Appointments
Clause challenge is to invalidate the actions of the improperly
appointed officer. If the remedy is not invalidation, it is difficult to
see what impetus Congress or the President has to establish proper

orderly functioning of the government despite technical defects in title to
office.
Id. at 180 (quoting 63A AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers & Employees § 578, at 1080–81
(1984)).
168. Cf. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182–83 (“We think that one who makes a timely
challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who
adjudicates his case is entitled to a decision on the merits of the question and
whatever relief may be appropriate if a violation indeed occurred. Any other rule
would create a disincentive to raise Appointments Clause challenges with respect to
questionable judicial appointments.”).
169. 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
170. Id. at 183; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 142.
171. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183–84. Besides pointing out that the “de facto officer”
doctrine was limited to statutorily improper appointments, the Court also
distinguished Ryder from Buckley on the ground that the former was a criminal case
while the latter was civil. Id. This distinction lacks staying power. In both contexts
the appointment is improper and violates the Constitution. Notably, the Court
provided no reasoning for why this distinction was significant. Cf. Kevin Sholette,
Note, The American Czars, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 240 n.172 (2010) (“[I]n
Appointments Clause challenges, the Supreme Court has chosen formalism over
functionalism by rejecting the ‘de facto officer doctrine’ . . . . The Court’s
unwillingness to apply the de facto officer doctrine to Appointments Clause
challenges jeopardizes the validity of any actions or decisions made by improper
appointees.” (citing Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183; Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536
(1962))).
172. See Jonathan M. Miller, Courts and the Creation of a “Spirit of Moderation”:
Judicial Protection of Revolutionaries in Argentina, 1863–1929, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 231, 247–48 n.64 (1997) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court, while not denying the
existence of the [de facto] doctrine, appears inclined to interpret de facto doctrine
narrowly, so as to avoid creating a disincentive to the challenge . . .”). But see Duffy,
supra note 139, at 922 n.88 (noting that the de facto officer doctrine “contains a
fundamental degree of flexibility that could make it attractive” for a court seeking to
avoid difficult problems that arise from invalidation).
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173

appointments—at least in the first instance.
Moreover, “[t]he de
facto officer doctrine is designed to address technical defects in
174
175
officeholding,” such as clerical errors or statutory requirements.
But if the Deputy Director’s actions, despite the unconstitutional
appointment, are simply accorded de facto validity, the
Appointments Clause will promptly devolve into “etiquette or
176
protocol” for the garden party that will be the federal government.
Invalidation, a material possibility and a more suitable remedy, could
leave the Bureau paralyzed, especially if the Deputy Director assumes
177
the Director’s duties during the Director’s absence.
The Director may not be able to mitigate the effect of the Deputy
Director’s unconstitutional appointment, whether or not a court
would invalidate certain past agency actions. The Deputy Director’s
functions (before or after a court’s invalidation of the appointment)
178
could not simply be delegated to other employees.
Those
employees, by assuming such duties while subject to the Director’s
oversight, would likely become inferior officers who must be
179
appointed under the Appointments Clause. Likewise, the Director
could not ratify the decisions of the Deputy Director (or an employee
to whom the inferior officer’s duties were delegated) without
rendering the Appointments Clause a dead letter as to inferior
officers. If such ratification were permissible, the Executive Branch
would have little reason to comply with the Appointments Clause for
180
either principal or inferior officers.
173. See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183. Although I concede that it is odd that the
improper appointment of all of an agency’s commissioners has a more limited
remedy than the improper appointment of one inferior official, the problem lies in
the Court’s ineffectual remedy in Buckley—a remedy that the Court has indicated will
be narrowly limited to its facts. See id. at 184 (refusing to apply “de facto officer”
doctrine to improperly appointed military judges).
174. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without
Authority, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 581, 596 (2001); see supra note 167 for a brief discussion
of the de facto officer doctrine.
175. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 174, at 595 (“The effect, and purpose, is to
prevent technical defects in an officer’s title, such as a clerical error or a failure to
post a required bond, from having potentially disastrous effects on settled legal
rights.”).
176. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)).
177. See Sholette, supra note 171, at 240 n.172 (stating that without the de facto
doctrine any decisions made by an improperly appointed officer may be invalidated).
178. See supra notes 28, 38–40 and accompanying text (reasoning any employee
who undertakes authority equal to an “Officer of the United States” becomes an
“Officer of the United States”).
179. See supra notes 28, 38–40 and accompanying text.
180. Perhaps the Executive Branch could argue that the Appointments Clause
would remain important because the Deputy Director may not be able to be paid
without a proper appointment. But the Executive Branch would likely be able to
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Perhaps the Director could, however, assign an improperly
appointed Deputy Director supervisory power over the Bureau’s data181
collection powers.
The Court in Buckley permitted an improperly
appointed Federal Election Commission to perform investigative and
data-collection functions because “those powers [are of the kind that]
182
Congress might delegate to one of its own committees.”
The
Bureau’s duties to collect data—even if only for rulemaking
183
purposes —should be similarly “legislative” or, at least, “quasi184
legislative” in nature. If so, the individual performing these duties
185
may not need to be appointed under the Appointments Clause.
Yet, depending on how the Director sets up the Bureau, this putative
solution may be impractical.
To preempt a quo warranto or other similar lawsuit by regulated
186
entities, Congress can amend 12 U.S.C. § 5491 to require another
187
method of appointment.
But, in the context of an independent
bureau within an independent agency, no perfect solution exists.
Congress could, for instance, permit the Governors of the Federal
Reserve to appoint the Deputy Director. In light of Free Enterprise
Fund, the Governors almost certainly constitute the head of a

create a position for the Deputy Director with other Executive Branch funds, either
as an employee or, like Ms. Warren, as an Assistant to the President. See Press
Release, President Barack Obama, Presidential Statement on Signing the
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act 2011 (Apr. 15,
2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/15/statementpresident-hr-1473 (arguing that the legislature’s attempt to limit the use of funds for
several of the President’s staff violates the separation of powers).
181. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1022(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1981–84 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5512) (delegating the task of data collection to the Bureau).
182. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137 (1976) (per curiam).
183. Dodd-Frank Act § 1022(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1981–82 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5512).
184. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137–38 (finding powers which are “essentially of an
investigative and informative nature” powers that the Commission may still exercise
(citing Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881))).
185. Id. at 137–38. But see supra note 164 (explaining that the Buckley Court’s
allowing of FEC officials to continue legislative tasks may not apply to the Deputy
Director).
186. A writ of quo warranto “inquire[s] into the authority by which a public office
is held.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1285 (8th ed. 2004).
187. See infra notes 190, 192, 194 and accompanying text (providing three separate
ways of changing the method of appointment). The suggestion that Congress alter
the Deputy Director’s method of appointment is not quixotic. When Professor John
F. Duffy identified the unconstitutional appointment of administrative patent judges,
Congress remedied the constitutional defect within approximately one year. See
Duffy, supra note 139, at 904 n.*, 918 n.72 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2006) (as amended
in August 2008)).
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188

department.
Yet, by giving the Governors this prerogative,
Congress must not only amend 12 U.S.C. § 5492, which currently
denies the Federal Reserve power to appoint the Bureau’s officers or
189
employees, but also render the Bureau less independent (and more
190
A similar
prone to agency capture) than originally envisioned.
problem would arise if Congress placed the appointment power in
the President alone. The President could appoint a Deputy Director
whose views are contrary to those of a Director appointed by a prior
191
President
and thereby reduce the agency’s independence.
Congress may also be able to permit other heads of departments (or
the courts of law) to choose the Deputy Director. Yet, even if such an
192
interbranch appointment is permitted, the independence of the
Bureau is once again compromised.
Congress’s final option requires that the President nominate the
193
Deputy Director with the Senate’s advice and consent.
This
method of appointment, used for some deputies, may be the most
194
The President’s choice would necessarily be
palatable solution.
approved by another branch of government, thereby limiting the
President’s ability to choose a Deputy Director who is incompatible
195
with the Director.
The necessity for the Senate’s consent will very
likely slow the appointment process and perhaps render the Deputy
Director’s appointment more political and contentious than it would
otherwise be. But, considering Congress’ limited options, traditional
confirmation is likely the best means of curing the Deputy Director’s
potentially defective appointment.
Even if the courts ultimately deem the appointment constitutional,
as I suggest that they should, Congress should act now because of the
stakes and timing. The Bureau has been controversial since its
inception, and moneyed financial institutions will be motivated to

188. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163–64 (2010) (holding
that SEC Commissioners are, collectively, a department head).
189. Dodd-Frank Act § 1012(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1965–66 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5491) (denying the governors the authority to “appoint, direct, or
remove any officer or employee of the Bureau”).
190. See supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text (describing the statutory
independence of the Bureau).
191. The Bureau’s Director is appointed for a five-year term, allowing for the
possibility that the Director’s term will overlap the terms of two presidents. See DoddFrank Act § 1011(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).
192. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675, 677 (1988) (permitting interbranch
appointments as long as they are not “incongruous”).
193. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
194. See supra note 78 (noting that the President, with the Senate’s advice and
consent, appoints the deputies for FEMA).
195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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196

limit the Bureau’s power.
A determination that the Deputy
Director’s appointment is unconstitutional could undermine
197
numerous Bureau proceedings and actions. Changing the method
of appointment removes one potential arrow from the Bureau’s
opponents’ quiver. And amending the statute now makes sense. The
198
Bureau is not scheduled to operate until the summer of 2011.
During this establishment period and the Bureau’s first months of
operation, Congress should ensure that the Deputy Director’s
199
appointment is unquestionably constitutional.
Of course, amending the Bureau’s organic act will lead opponents
to seek other changes to the Bureau’s powers. The Republicans, who
gained control of the House of Representatives in January 2011, have
200
already indicated that they plan to “revisit” the Bureau anyway.
If
they “revisit” the Bureau, Congress and the President may as well
ensure that the Bureau’s powers are not later, and unnecessarily,
called into doubt or invalidated.
Moreover, congressional

196. See, e.g., Brush, supra note 108.
197. See supra note 173–179 and accompanying text.
198. See Fred Rivera, Consumer Protection Bureau Set to Take Flight July 21, 2011,
FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION MONITOR (Sept. 21, 2010),
http://www.financialserviceslitigationmonitor.com/2010/09/articles/federalagencies/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-set-to-take-flight-july-21-2011/
(noting that the Bureau’s full regulatory powers do not commence until late July
2011).
199. See supra notes 194–195 and accompanying text.
200. Dave Clarke & Rachelle Younglai, Republicans Want to Revisit Financial
Regulation Reform Bill, INS. J. (Sept. 21, 2010),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2010/09/21/113382.htm; see also
Jennifer Liberto, Wall Street Reform Stuck On Consumer Protection, CNN MONEY (May 6,
2010
3:52
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/06/news/economy/consumer_protection/index.
htm (referring to disputes over the Bureau and its powers that Senators sought to
negotiate prior to Dodd-Frank’s passage).
Senator Richard Shelby (R–Ala.) said not only that “[t]he consumer agency
bothers me the most,” but “I thought the creation of it and the way it was created was
a mistake.” Clark & Younglai, supra; see also Jon Prior, Bachmann Introduces Repeal of
Dodd-Frank, Fires Back At Critics, HOUSING WIRE (Jan. 6, 2011 11:25 AM),
http://www.housingwire.com/2011/01/06/bachmann-drops-dodd-frank-repealahead-of-criticism (reporting that Representative Michelle Bachmann (R–Minn.)
introduced a bill to repeal Dodd-Frank and the Bureau); David Weidner, The
Republican Eraser, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2011 11:34 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704721104576106620934547598
.html (“If [the Republicans] can’t close the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
they want to make its chief accountable to Congress and its budget subject to the
House Appropriations Committee.”).
The White House has not ignored these potential threats to the Bureau. Warren
met with critics of the agency—both inside and outside of Congress—who seek either
to weaken or “kill the agency.” See Maya Jackson Randall, Warren Meets With ConsumerBureau Critics, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2011, 1:04 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703293204576106100404370190.h
tml.
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reconsideration of Dodd-Frank may not be as painful as Democrats
fear. Although the public may have soured on Democrats generally,
201
the public, as a whole, supports the Bureau, and a handful of
202
Republicans has endorsed the Bureau. Ultimately, the Bureau may
be better off taking its chances with Congress rather than the courts.
CONCLUSION
Although who or what, respectively, constitutes an “inferior officer”
and a “department” may seem intuitive, these concepts suffer from
203
ambiguity due to the Constitution’s text and judicial decisions. The
relative rarity of appointment challenges provides few opportunities
204
for courts to clarify these concepts, especially as to agency deputies.
Because of the indefinite contours of these terms, Congress must be
exceedingly vigilant in ensuring that the agencies and offices that it
creates comport with the Constitution.
The appointment of deputies may seem, to Congress and perhaps
many others, the stuff of minutiae and abstract technicalities. But an
unconstitutional appointment has practical consequences, even if the
Supreme Court’s prior decisions provide mere clues as to precisely
205
what the consequences will be.
Whether the Deputy Director’s
appointment is constitutional is a significant question that Congress
and the President should confront now. Permitting a controversial
bureau to establish itself under a cloud of unconstitutionality is
neither wise nor responsible.

201. One survey indicates that 57% of Americans support the creation of a
consumer-financial-protection bureau. See Survey: Americans Want Consumer Agency for
Financial Products and Services, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., 1–3 (Sept. 9, 2009),
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/CFPA_Poll_Rel
ease_3_Sep_09_2009_final.pdf.
202. David Dayen, Dodd-Frank Passes House, FIREDOGLAKE (July 30, 2010 4:02 PM),
http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/06/30/dodd-frank-passes-house/ (noting that
Republican House Representatives Joseph Cao, Mike Castle, and Walter Jones voted
for Dodd-Frank); Brady Dennis, Congress Passes Financial Reform Bill, WASH. POST, July
16, 2010, at A01 (noting that Republican Senators Scott Brown, Susan Collins, and
Olympia Snowe voted for Dodd-Frank).
203. See Bhagwat, supra note 40, at 983 (“The term ‘inferior,’ however, turns out to
be somewhat more ambiguous than first appears . . . .”).
204. See supra Parts II & III.
205. See supra note 161.

